ought to be expected to have a more constraining effect on Chinese behaviour as the Chinese economy has become more dependent on foreign investment and markets for growth, and concomitantly, as the Party's legitimacy rests increasingly on supplying these economic benefits. The literature on how international institutions and norms affect states suggests that China's behaviour will be increasingly restricted or transformed by the rules of these institutions.
On the other hand, the nature of China's political system has changed much less dramatically: the regime continues to promote nationalist discourses in domestic and foreign policy. Hyper-sovereignty values are still a central driver of Chinese foreign policy. A realpolitik strategic culture still colours the world-views of many of China's senior security policy decision makers, a world-view in which military force is a potentially useful tool, among others, for the pursuit of traditional power and prestige maximizing national interests in a competitive and relatively dangerous world. 2 There is still a large number of unresolved, or ambiguously resolved, territorial disputes between China and its neighbours. There is still a relatively large gap between the status that China desires and the status that other states are willing to bestow. And it is still not clear that China's decision makers fully understand the concept of the security dilemma -where a defensive action taken by one status quo actor is interpreted as threatening by another; the second actor then takes what it believes are defensive counteractions that, in turn, are interpreted by the first actor. The result is an interactive spiral of insecurity. 3 The tension today between external economic, institutional and normative constraints on Chinese behaviour on the one hand and realpolitik concepts of "majorpowerhood" internalized by China's leaders on the other has never been more acute in the history of the People's Republic. This makes straight-line projections from historical patterns in conflict behaviour somewhat risky. Those who doubt that "interdependence" has constrained Chinese behaviour point to the recent Taiwan crisis as an example. Between 18 and 30 per cent of China's exports go to the American market and almost $30 billion of Taiwanese money is currently 2. This is not a unique world view among the major powers. China's version of sovereignty converges in many places with that espoused by Gaullists in France and Republicans and isolationists in the United States. The reason the U.S. has not ratified international treaties governing the rights of women and children, the reason why Jessie Helms opposed American ratification of the treaty on genocide and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the reason why Bob Dole once claimed that UN peacekeeping activities were "out of control," and the reason the U.S. is in arrears in its financial obligations to the UN is precisely the fear in some quarters in the U.S. that international institutions and obligations impinge on its sovereignty and autonomy.
3. In one conversation I had with a highly placed strategic analyst in PLA in July 1996 he concluded that the concept of a security dilemma was probably not well understood at the top. Thus they are less sensitive to the interactive, and possibly counterproductive effects of China's military modernization programme. The same, of course, could be said about American and Soviet leaderships through most of the Cold War, with the exception perhaps of Gorbachev. The Clinton administration's drive to develop and deploy ballistic missile defences that might also undermine China's fragile deterrent is another example of inattention to unintended consequences (Chinese nuclear modernization) that could, in the end, reduce American security. invested in China, yet Chinese leaders risked a major confrontation with American naval power over Taiwanese flexible diplomacy. This does little to buttress the argument that "trading state" major powers are less belligerent than traditional territorially acquisitive major powers. An Asian Wall Street Journal article argued during the missile crisis in the spring of 1996 that China's military exercises turned interdependence arguments on their head. For proponents of this kind of argument, China's past behaviour in conflicts and crises is crucial for forecasting future behaviour.
The counter-argument would look at the counter-factuals. Would there have been such a careful delineation of the boundaries of the PLA military exercises, such careful signalling to American and Taiwanese officials, such continuing normalcy in all other aspects of Sino-U.S. and China-Taiwan economic, cultural and political relationships in the midst of a very heavy concentration of modern firepower if these economic linkages had not existed? Some analysts I spoke to in China at the time of the Taiwan crisis acknowledged that regional economic and politics leaders from South-East China were not as enthusiastic about the use of force as the PLA apparently was, for obvious economic reasons. For proponents of this kind of argument, China's past conflict management behaviour is less likely to determine future behaviour, except for issues that clearly affect territorial integrity and political legitimacy. Whichever argument is more accurate, however, a systematic understanding of patterns of conflict and crisis management would be a helpful addition to the evolving debate about the meaning of China's rise.
The focus of this study is on Chinese conflict and crisis management behaviour. Neither of these two concepts is particularly well defined in the international relations literature. Steve Chan, who provided one of the earlier, systematic analyses of Chinese behaviour, defined conflict management as "deliberate policy programs designed to monitor the actions and intentions of one's actual or potential adversaries, to deter them from carrying out unwanted policies, to engage in military conflict with them should deterrence fail and to control and resolve such conflicts lest they threaten more important domestic and foreign policy goals." 4 This is a very broad definition: it includes day-to-day security analysis, political, diplomatic and military signalling, the actual use of force, and the termination of the use of force. In effect, it covers all five nodes in a rough conceptualization of the stages of conflict behaviour by states (see Figure I) . 5 Chan's own study, however, focuses empirically on five cases of the use of force (such as situations that emerge after deterrence failure), that is, behaviour that occurs after node three. This selection 4. Steve Chan, "Chinese conflict calculus and behavior: assessments from a perspective of conflict management," World Politics, No. 2 (1978), p. 391.
5. Figure 1 provides a simplification of the major decision stages that foreign policy decision makers face in conflicts with other states. Once a conflict has emerged, it may develop to a level of acuteness where it constitutes a crisis. Once in a crisis, decision makers must decide whether or not to use force. Once they have decided to use force, they must then decide what level and spatial/temporal scope of force to use. A particular scope of force may then change the crisis situation such that escalation is required or termination of the crisis becomes possible. no conflict makes it difficult to determine the conditions under which, when in a crisis, China decides to use force in the first place.
Crisis management behaviour refers somewhat more narrowly to actions in situations of short duration and intense interaction where there is a high probability of escalation to violence because the things under threat (say, territory, strategic policies or regime stability) are considered to be highly valuable (such as nodes 2 to 5). 6 Of course, all nodes are of interest in order to understand the nature of Chinese coercive diplomacy. But for the purposes of intellectual manageability, this study concentrates more on crisis management behaviour: in other words, what kinds of crises has China historically found itself in, and once in a crisis or dispute, under what conditions does it resort to what kinds (scope) of force (nodes 2 to 4). Patterns in China's escalation or termination of crises, of course, are critically important to understand as well, but such a study should come after one that focuses on explaining the resort to force in the first place.
One critical issue is evidence and sources. Given the obvious difficulties in acquiring detailed primary materials on Chinese crisis management decision making over a large number of cases, my approach is quite eclectic. I am interested in broad patterns in the frequency and scope of crisis management behaviour, as well as in some initial comparisons with other countries, so as to put Chinese behaviour in context. All too often, consciously or unconsciously, China specialists have treated Chinese behaviour as unique and incomparable across time and across countries.
This article explores a relatively new data set on national crisis management behaviour, the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set. This was compiled by the Correlates of War research group at the University of Michigan over the last decade or so, and defines MIDs as "united historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state,"
7 that is, a sequence of causally connected actions where military force of varying levels is used against other states for political purposes. For China, there are 118 cases of MIDs from 1949 to 1992, the year for which the data set ends.
There are two key variables of interest in the MID data. The first is the type of action taken by a disputant. Here the compilers of the data set developed two indicators. One is a five-point categorical hostility scale measuring the level of the hostility reached by the disputant in a dispute and ranging from no hostile actions up to interstate war. The other is a typology of 21 kinds of actions ranging from no militarized action through blockades and seizures to the use of nuclear weapons. 8 The second main variable of interest is the type of goal in the dispute. The MID data classifies the disputes into three basic types: "territorial," where a state is using some level of force primarily to change or defend the territorial status quo; "policy," where a state is using some level of force primarily to change the foreign policies of another; and "regime," where a state is using some level of force primarily to change the nature of the government of another state.
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The caveats in using aggregate data are obvious and there is no one inherently better or worse method. The problems of inference in quantitative analysis are different from those in qualitative analysis, but they are not worse. The problems arise mainly with the development of valid indicators for some underlying variable whose causal effects are being tested, or with the sloppy coding of cases. Those who use these data must to some extent rely on the skill and consistency of those coding the data. But the process of drawing inferences is explicit and, in principle, reproducible, open to confirmation or critique by other scholars. Qualitative methods run into problems precisely because of the difficulty in 7. Stuart Bremer, J. David Singer and Dan Jones, "Militarized interstate disputes, 1816-1992: rationale, coding rules and statistical findings," mimeo, February 1996, p. 6.
8. See n. 31 for a detailed list of the categories in these two variables. 9. There is a certain arbitrariness in this kind of coding. Disputes almost invariably involve more than one issue and states often have a number of goals when entering a dispute. But, to the extent that the historical documentation is available, it is often fairly obvious how these goals are ranked by decision makers. Given the number of MIDs coded for all countries from 1815 to 1992 (N = 2042), and given the general credibility of Correlates of War data sets in the field of quantitative international relations, I think it is fair to assume that coding instructions were rigorous and coding errors were random across all cases and thus are random for the Chinese cases as well (e.g. that they cancel each other out on balance). The process of coding is described in Daniel Jones, "Preliminary user's manual: militarized interstate disputes" (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, Correlates of War Project, 1 July 1991).
reproducing, confirming and critiquing the process of inference. Both kinds of problems require one to be tentative in the presentation of findings. Suffice it to say, the analysis of the MID data here is "triangulated" where necessary with other primary and secondary materials on specific cases.
The article is organized as follows. The first section reviews the relatively limited existing literature on Chinese conflict and crisis management to draw out what is thought to be known about patterns in Chinese behaviour. The second section provides a wholly inductive, descriptive analysis of patterns in Chinese behaviour found in the MID data set. The third section then tests some of the predominant explanatory hypotheses about crisis management behaviour in international relations theory literature to see if any sense can be made out of the patterns in the data.
What is Thought to be Known About China's Crisis Behaviour
The dominant view of Chinese conflict and crisis management behaviour, whether in Western or Chinese scholarship, is that China has historically stressed the limited, political uses of coercive diplomacy, and has eschewed crusading, offensive wars a outrance. This pattern, it has been argued, characterized imperial China and has persisted into the People's Republic. The secondary literature pretty much accepts the notion that in Chinese strategic thought and practice the use of violence was a "last resort," to use Fairbank's words. 10 This reluctance to resort to force rested, it is argued, on a low estimation of the efficacy of violence which was inherent in the Confucian moral order, and led to the "pacifist bias of the Chinese tradition." 11 Different authors put it different ways: a stress on psychological warfare over the use of weaponry and firepower; 12 a stress on "gaining victory while keeping as much intact as possible both socially and materially rather than destroying who or whatever stands in the way"; 13 an "anti-militarist bias"; 14 an emphasis on humans or mind over weaponry and the use of non-violent strategem and deception to overcome "bare strength"; 15 an "aversion to violence in war"; 16 the absence of a notion of ideologically based total war; 17 the minimization • of war and the corollary that wars which were not minimized were ethically unjust;
18 a "systematic denial of belligerence"; 19 a view that war is an "aberration"; 20 and "strategy by strategem" 21 as opposed, presumably, to strategy involving the application of violence among other similar characterizations.
Scholars have tried to trace the roots of this minimal violence axiom to a number of disparate sources. 22 One is Sun Zi's notion of "not fighting and subduing the enemy" (bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing). Others suggest that it comes from Lao Zi and his doctrine of using "softness to overcome hardness" (yi mo ke gang). Still others contend that the deprecation of violence is rooted in the Confucian-Mencian emphasis on the ruler's cultivation of virtue and good government as the basis for the security and prosperity of the state. When the use of force becomes "unavoidable" then, the literature suggests, Chinese strategic propensities lean to the defensive and limited use of force. Offensive wars of annihilation were rarely used historically. Chinese political and military leaders generally eschewed exterminating states, occupying territory or killing the people of an enemy state, and prefered security through the enculturation of "barbarians."
Another alleged element of Chinese strategic thought and behaviour is a stress on limited wars, that is, military behaviour constrained by well-defined spatial and temporal restrictions on violence. China has been relatively successful, it is argued, in using limited amounts of force, in co-ordination with diplomatic tools, to pursue clearly defined, limited political aims. Grand strategic behaviour in the post-1949 period has been characterized by defence at or only slightly beyond "the gates," a relative rather than zero-sum concept of victory, pacification and deterrence, a non-zero sum concept of conflict which reduces pressures to escalate, and an ability to preserve a strict hierarchy of political goals in the midst of conflict, among other traits. There are very few dissenting voices to this characterization of Chinese strategic traditions. 24 Yet new research based on heretofore unavailable primary materials from the 1950s suggest that China's dispute behaviour has in some cases been higher risk, more militarized and less connected to specific limited political demands than was once believed. It has, in some cases, also been less than successful, exposing China to unexpectedly severe security threats. 25 In the spirit of re-examination that these new secondary works embody, below is a first cut at some new data that it is hoped will allow scholars to think more comparatively across time and space about China's dispute management behaviour.
Descriptive Analysis of Chinese Crisis/Dispute Management Behaviour
It might be best to begin with some of the simplest findings from the MID data set. How frequently has China become involved in militarized disputes, relative to other major powers? ; that the PRC has never occupied "one inch" of another state's territory; that the PRC has never invaded another state except to "teach it a lesson" as part of a just counterattack against prior aggression; and that the PRC prefers to use political rather than military means to resolve disputes. . Segal looks at nine cases of the Chinese use of force from 1949 to 1985 and argues that there were no obvious patterns, that China demonstrated strategic and tactical flexibility and a willingness to use whatever amount of force necessary to achieve a wide range of political ends. One problem with the study is that it "selects on the dependent variable": that is, by focusing only on crises in which force was used it is hard to determine the kinds of conditions that led or didn't lead to the use of force in the first place. This also makes it difficult to compare China's dispute behaviour with that of other states. 26. I want to emphasize that dispute proneness says nothing in particular about intentions, that is, it does not equal "aggressiveness," nor does it say anything about whether or not China initiated these disputes. It is simply a measure of the number of disputes that China has become involved in, regardless of which state started the dispute. Thus these data should not be interpreted as "China is the second most aggressive major power in the international system" or something such as that.
China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992 27 This statistic ranks China as the second most dispute-prone state of the major powers in the post-Second World War period, behind the United States (see Table 1 ). If one looks at dispute proneness for the major powers over their history as states, China still ranks second, though this time behind the Soviet Union (see Table 2 ). Disaggregating further -into decade-long periods -China was the most dispute-prone major power in the 1950s, though the United States was a very close second (see Figure 2) . 28 But for the remaining decades China was consistently the second most dispute-prone state until 1990 (India's level of dispute proneness reaches that of China for the 1980s). 29 The gap between Chinese dispute proneness and that of the first place holder -the United States -increases over time.
27. This datum refers to the number of MIDs that start in that particular year, not the total number that start and are ongoing from earlier years.
28. The vertical axis is the total number of disputes per country in each decade. 29. The average number of MIDs per year drops dramatically in the 1990s to 0.3 for the PRC, the lowest of all the major powers plus India. France replaces China as the second most dispute-prone major power from 1990 to 1993 after the U.S. with an average of 2 MIDs per year, compared to 2.6 for the U.S. Since there are only three disputes in this decade for China, however, these data should not be given too much weight as indicative of trends for the rest of the decade.
The China Quarterly 1980s. In other words, the Dengist period until the late 1980s was not noticeably less MID-prone than the late Maoist period, though it was less dispute-prone than most of the rest of the Maoist period.
Type. As for the primary political goals in China's disputes, the largest portion of Chinese MIDs were classified by the Correlates of War team as "territorial" (type 1) (49 per cent), with those coded "policy" (type 2) the second most frequent (42.3 per cent) and those coded "regime" 
1989-
The China Quarterly 30 The lion's share of territorial MIDs (41 per cent) occurred in the first ten years of the People's Republic of China (PRC) (see Figure 5 ). As suggested below, these data are consistent with the hypothesis that new states will be more sensitive about establishing territorial control, and thus one should expect the prevalence of territorial MIDs earlier in the regime's history.
Force levels. The MID data use two indicators to represent the levels of force reached by a state in a dispute: a five-point hostility level scale and a scale comprising 21 categories of action. 31 Using hostility levels first, the most violent periods were at the beginning of the regime (because of the Korean War) and in the mid-1980s (because of ongoing conflicts with Vietnam). 32 The average hostility level per dispute in the 30. Most of those coded "regime" involved disputes with Taiwan in the mid-1960s. Thus one could plausibly recode these as territorial disputes, as the Taiwan issue was in some sense a dispute over sovereign control of the island. Moreover, Chinese uses of force against Taiwan were not designed to overthrow the Kuomintang since the PLA was simply incapable of doing so. Finally, Chinese military conflicts with KMT forces would not have occurred had China not claimed Taiwan as Chinese territory. The number of disputes coded "regime" is small, however, and does not change the analysis dramatically.
31. The hostility levels are: no militarized response (1), threat of force (2), display of force (3), use of force (4), interstate war (5). The categories of actions are: threat to use force (1), to blockade (2), to occupy territory (3), to declare war (4), to use nuclear weapons (5), alert (6), mobilization (7), show of troops (8), show of ships (9), show of planes (10), fortification of border (11), nuclear alert (12), border violation (13), blockade (14) , occupation of territory (15), seizure of material or personnel (16), clash (17), other use of military force (18), declaration of war (19), tactical use of nuclear weapons (20), interstate war (21).
32. Although these are categorical data and technically ought not to be averaged, since they do reflect an interval-like increase in violence I did not see much danger in averaging them. ). The lowest average hostility level was in the 1969-73 period when China -essentially recovering from the Cultural Revolution and opening a strategic relationship with the United States -was in one of its least dispute-prone periods. Average hostility levels per dispute dropped to just over level 2 (actions entailing the "threat to use force"). With the exception of the Cultural Revolution period -when Chinese attentions were focused on internal political struggle -there is a relatively constant average hostility in Chinese disputes throughout the entire post-1949 period. In comparative terms the average level of hostility reached by the PRC per dispute was greater than that of India, France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945 onwards. China's average hostility score in the post-1949 period was 3.71, statistically significantly higher than the average among these powers (3.53). 33 The next highest means were France, India, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States, with only the United States being statistically significantly lower than the mean.
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In terms of the 21 categories of militarized action, as a proportion of all codable disputes China's top three choices of action were "clashes" 33. A difference of means test was significant at the p = 0.012 level, meaning that China's higher-than-average hostility levels is unlikely to be random.
34. The difference of means test was significant at the p = 0.0 level, meaning that the United States' lower-than-average difference in average hostility levels is unlikely to be random. In most of its disputes China also tended to escalate to a level of force at the same level of hostility as that used by its adversaries in the same dispute ( Figure 7) . 35 In about 20 per cent of its disputes China would escalate to a higher level of hostility than its adversary, and in less than 20 per cent of cases to a lower level. Disaggregating this pattern, however, one finds some variation: in nearly half its disputes with the United States, China tended to escalate to a higher level of hostility than the United States did in the same dispute (Figure 8) .
The five-point hostility scale is useful as a first cut at examining China's escalation patterns. But it is still a fairly blunt measure of hostility: level 4 (the use of force), for example, cannot differentiate between limited exchanges of fire across a border and the more serious acts of seizing a piece of territory or declaring war. A more fine-tuned violence score can be constructed by multiplying the action code number and the hostility level number. 36 This creates an interval-type scale that captures the exponential nature of increasingly violent uses of force in disputes. The average violence score per MID for the PRC was 61.34, again statistically significantly higher than the average for the other states included in the analysis. The sample mean was 53.085. The next highest means were France (58), India (57.3), the Soviet Union (49.88), Britain 35. Per cent refers to the percentage of China's MIDs in which China escalated to a level similar to, higher than, or less than its opponent.
36. The scale captures the vast difference between very low levels of threat to use force (e.g. a threat to blockade would have a violence score of 4 (action code 2 X hostility level 2)) versus the use of weapons of mass destruction in all-out interstate war (action code 21 X hostility level 5 = violence level 105). The actual numerical boundaries or values of this metric have no intrinsic meaning other than that they allow one to differentiate statistically and more accurately between very low levels and very high levels of violence. This allows more fine-tuned comparisons within and across states in their dispute behaviour. These statistics, in combination with the MID frequency statistics, suggest that until 1992, although China was not the most dispute-prone of the major powers, it was the most violence-prone. That is, once in a militarized dispute, on average China tended to resort to a higher level of force than other major powers.
MID type and violence levels. The data suggest that China was relatively consistent in the kinds of actions it took regardless of the type of conflict. There is little correlation between dispute type and hostility level (see Figure 10 ). In about 80 per cent of MIDs coded as policy and regime-related disputes, China resorted to hostility level 4 (the use of force). It was slightly less likely to resort to force in territorial disputes, but still in about 65 per cent of these cases it escalated to hostility level 4. It did not go to interstate war over regime/government MIDs, meaning that it never resorted to war to overthrow a regime in another state.
This pattern holds as well when one uses the interval-scale violence scores as an indicator for level of force used in a dispute. As Figure 11 indicates, there is not as much variation in average violence scores across dispute types. China's violence scores tend to cluster together at about the same level across all three types of conflict. France's violence profile is the most similar to that of China's. This contrasts with most of the other comparative cases where there is more skewing. The United States, for instance, was far more likely to act more violently in policy-related MIDs than in territorial MIDs. The Soviet Union was far more likely to act more violently in regime-related MIDs, as was India (though in India's case the N = 1). As the data indicate, however, China was more likely to act more violently in territorial and policy MIDs (types 1 and 2) than the other states compared here.
If one refines the analysis and looks at the 21-category action scale (Figure 12 ), the most common form of action taken by China in its territorial disputes was overwhelmingly the military "clash" (48 per cent of cases). This was followed well behind by "other force" (9.7 per cent of cases) and border violations (also 9.7 per cent). In MIDs relating to
efforts to change other state's policies, China's behaviour tended to be distributed more evenly among seizures (31 per cent), clashes (24 per cent) and "other force" (21 per cent). Finally, in MIDs aimed at changing other state's governments, the most common form of violence was "other force" (60 per cent) followed by border violations (20 per cent) and clashes (20 per cent). Since most of these MIDs were conflicts with Taiwan, "other force" probably refers to things such as artillery barrages, one of the key forms of violence China used in the various disputes with Taiwan over the islands off the East China coast.
The data suggest, then, that in general China has been more disputeprone than many other major powers (except the United States); it has also been more likely than most other major powers to resort to higher levels of force when in a militarized dispute, regardless of the type of dispute. While the first 15 years of its existence were more dispute-prone than the subsequent 25, there has been a fairly constant level of hostility and violence across Chinese MIDs up to the end of the 1980s. While average violence scores were quite consistent across all types of disputes, China tended to resort to the highest scale of military action ("clashes") in territorial disputes.
Explanations
There is a range of plausible hypotheses that might explain the general features of China's dispute management behaviour. Below are analyses of some of the standard explanations in the international relations literature to see how well they account for the patterns in the data, and to suggest which explanations can probably be put aside and which are worth pursuing further. 
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Diversionary theories of conflict and crisis behaviour. One general hypothesis is that states will deliberately create or escalate external conflicts, disputes and crises for domestic political purposes. As Levy has shown, there are a number of related variations on this theme:
38 external crises will be manufactured to divert domestic attention from the policy failures of the regime; crises will be used to consolidate the legitimacy of the regime as it portrays itself as the main bulwark against a dangerous external adversary; crises will be used to justify the repression of internal opposition; external crises will be used to justify the mobilization of resources for political or economic strategies.
How well do various diversionary explanations work in the China case? Christensen has argued convincingly that the Jinmen and Mazu crisis of 1958 was designed primarily to create an atmosphere of threat with which to mobilize the population for the radical Great Leap Forward experiment. 39 In the aggregate, however, the data do not appear to fit with most of the diversionary war hypotheses.
For one thing, there is no relationship between domestic unrest and China's use of force externally. As a first cut, the frequency of protests was used as an indicator of domestic unrest; 40 as the graph of annual frequencies in MIDs and protests shows (Figure 13 ), the frequency of protests basically picks up as the frequency of MIDs declines from the late 1960s onwards. This is not the pattern one would expect if diversionary uses of force were being designed to suppress domestic unrest. It is possible that the MIDs in the 1950s and 1960s were successful in 38. Jack S. Levy, "The diversionary theory of war: a critique," in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed. diverting attention and thus protests occurred with less frequency in these years. But even so, one would at least expect to see some rise in protests prior to increases in disputes during the 1950s and 1960s.
The diversionary hypothesis is further undermined by a test for any relationship between the amount of domestic unrest and the amount of externally directed violence. The theory would suggest, at its simplest, that an increase in domestic unrest in one period should lead to an increase in the level of conflict China is engaged in with other states. To test this hypothesis a simple linear regression model was constructed. The dependent variable in the model is the cumulative yearly amount of violence (the sum of the violence scores for all disputes in that year). The independent variables are riots, protests, executions and sanctions. The frequency of riots and protests captures popular expression of opposition. The frequency of executions and sanctions can be used as a proxy for the regime's concerns about domestic opposition. Together, these independent variables capture domestic unrest. 41 The results of the test are in Table 3 . Except for sanctions, the indicators of domestic turmoil are negatively related to an increase in violence. In other words, contrary to a hypothesis about the diversionary use of violence, in the China case an increase in domestic unrest leads to a decrease in the yearly amount of MID-related violence. 42 This suggests a "pre-occupation" model is more appropriate than a diversionary model, that is, a preoccupation with domestic social disorder is associated with a lower level of externally directed violence. If one uses the same data to test the reverse hypothesis, namely that external violence in one period leads to the decline of domestic unrest in subsequent periods-a "suppression model" -there is no statistically significant relationship 41. The independent variables are lagged by one year, as one might expect if conflict is being used to divert domestic attention. The data come from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.
42. The adjusted R 2 = 0.29. That is, almost 30% of the variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by the independent variables. All the independent variables are statistically significant below the standard 0.05 level. between either MID frequencies or cumulative yearly amounts of violence on the one hand and indicators of domestic unrest on the other.
The foreign policy of revolutionary states. A second set of hypotheses draws from work on the foreign policies of revolutionary states. Here there are two basic arguments. The first is that revolutionary states tend to be led, initially at least, by people with messianic or manichean world views. Whether for purposes of mobilizing (or terrorizing) populations, or justifying militarized revolutionary behaviour with militant symbols and myths, revolutionary movements tend to understand the external world as one full of adversaries and threats. Foreign policy will tend to reflect this strategic culture. This world view will push revolutionary states into more frequent crises and escalation.
The second argument is somewhat the reverse: because revolutionary states at least appear to threaten regional and at times the global political and economic status quo, there are pre-emptive pressures on status quo states to deal with this potential threat early before the revolutionary state(s) becomes too powerful. This will lead to counter-revolutionary alliances and foreign policies among surrounding states, pulling revolutionary states into more conflicts with other states on average. 43 In the Chinese case, then, there ought to be a correlation between periods of heightened revolutionary militancy on the one hand and conflict involvement and/or levels of violence on the other. There is some evidence -based on newly available Russian and Chinese documents -that Mao's decision to enter the Korean War and to support the nationalist revolution in northern Vietnam in the 1950s was motivated by a desire to expand the influence of Communist parties in East Asia.
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Scholars have also argued, of course, that American involvement in Vietnam-a source of many Chinese MIDs in the mid-1960s-was in part driven by a fear of Chinese expansionism and by a desire to prove wrong the Maoist model of rural revolution. These examples would suggest both a "push" and a "pull" correlation between revolutionary militancy and several kinds of militarized disputes.
Yet the relationship is more ambiguous than this. During the height of Maoist revolutionary fervour in the Cultural Revolution the frequency and average violence scores of China's MIDs were generally much lower than before or after this period. If one uses a simpler indicator of the presence of revolutionary ideology -say, the duration of Mao's rule -one finds a fairly dramatic variation in the frequency and violence levels of disputes within the Maoist period. Moreover, there is relatively little variation in the frequency and average violence of disputes across the late Maoist period to the last years of the Dengist period. Yet Deng's China has been identified with the wholesale abandonment of most of Mao's ideological legacies.
As an alternative test, one might plausibly hypothesize that revolutionary states tend to militarize their societies and economies: the more militarized the society, the more militant the politics, and thus the more likely the state will become involved in MIDs, whether for push or for pull reasons. Is this the case in China? A series of simple bivariate linear regression analyses indicates the relationship is in fact ambiguous. For this test the share of China's total world power capabilities comprising military expenditures and military personnel were used as indicators of militarization. 45 That is, the greater China's share of power attributable to its military expenditures and military personnel, the more militarized the economy and society; and the more militarized the economy and society, the more militant the polity. The more militant the polity, the greater China's dispute proneness.
As it turns out, however, this relationship is not especially strong. There is no positive relationship between the increasing share of total Chinese power capabilities devoted to military expenditures on the one hand and MID involvement on the other (adjusted R 2 = 0, p = 0.9). Nor is there a statistically significant relationship between the proportion of Chinese power capabilities comprising military personnel and dispute proneness (adjusted R 2 = 0.04, p = 0.12). However, when disaggregated into disputes with the Soviets and Americans, there is a relatively strong positive relationship in the case of China's MIDs with the Soviet Union, but no relationship in the case of MIDs with the United States. 46 This finding fits the nature of China's conflict with the Soviet Union. While ideological competition between Communism and capitalism was obviously an element in Chinese conceptions of Sino-U.S. conflict in the 1950s, the geopolitical conflicts of interest were perhaps more prominent in the Chinese calculus. American power threatened Chinese domestic stability and territory, whether in Korea, Taiwan or Vietnam. Thus Maoist militancy was probably not the driving element in China's conflicts with the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. The ideological component of the Sino-Soviet dispute, however, was prominent throughout. Territorial and geopolitical competition were products, to some extent, of the collapse in shared identities as Marxist-Leninist states. The Chinese accusations of Soviet betrayal of socialism and Soviet charges that Maoists were out to subvert the Soviet-led socialist bloc came in the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, periods of ideological fervour and/or militarization within China. These were also periods when China's militarized disputes and border clashes with the Soviets were most intense. Thus the different findings in China's disputes with the Americans and with the Soviets may reflect different core issues in the conflicts with each superpower.
Foreign policy balancing.
Another possible explanation for patterns in China's dispute behaviour draws from neo-realist theory. Neo-realists might argue that China's militarized behaviour reflects the frictions generated by its efforts to balance against the dominant player(s) in the international system, given the threat posed to the security and autonomy of China from a system dominated by another power. As long as China is a weak major power in a bipolar system, its primary security concerns should come from the two poles -the United States or Soviet Union. Thus most of China's disputes should be with one of the two contenders for system hegemony, depending on which is predominant.
The evidence, on the whole, does not buttress this kind of balancing argument. To test this hypothesis a series of simple linear regression equations were run testing the relationship between superpower power on the one hand and various features of Chinese dispute behaviour on the other. There is certainly a positive and significant relationship between the frequency of China's disputes with the United States and the United States' share of global military expenditures (adjusted R 2 = 0.12, p = 0.02). 47 This would be consistent with a neo-realist balancing argument. As American global power peaked in the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese MIDs with the United States also peaked. As the American share of world military power declined in the mid to late 1970s and through the 1980s, China had no MIDs with the United States. This was, of course, the period of Sino-U.S. anti-Soviet collaboration. One would expect, then, that as the Soviet share of world power increased, China would begin to balance against the Soviets and one should expect to see a similar relationship between Chinese MIDs and Soviet power. However, the results of the regression analysis for the Soviet case shows no relationship between changes in the Soviet share of world power and the 47. Neorealists are, unfortunately, unclear about how to measure power. But in order to be consistent with their materialist ontology, they should concede that for research purposes power can be measured using material capabilities, military expenditures for instance. Thus for the purposes of testing this balancing hypothesis, I use Soviet and American shares of world military expenditures as the independent variables. If one were to use some indicator for "perceptions" of power, then one would not be making a neorealist argument.
frequency of Chinese MIDs with the Soviet Union (adjusted R 2 = -0.03, p = 0.97).
If one looks at the proportion of China's MIDs with the superpowers (assuming that as a major power China is compelled to balance against potential systemic hegemonies and thus will be less pre-occupied with conflicts with smaller states), the findings are similarly problematic for neo-realist theory. There is a weak, though significant, positive relationship between change in American share of world power and the portion of China's total MIDs that are with the United States (adjusted R 2 = 0.08, p = 0.05). There is no statistically significant relationship in the SinoSoviet case (adjusted R 2 = 0.01, p = 0.4), however. 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 year Indeed, over time, disputes with the superpowers as a portion of China's total disputes has declined even as the international system remained bipolar. Figure 14 indicates that the rate of cumulation of disputes with the superpowers slows relative to the overall cumulation rate from the early 1970s onwards. That is, the superpowers have not been the only interlocutors in Chinese MIDs. If one of China's basic strategic decision rules were to balance primarily against the dominant state(s) in the international system, one would expect that Chinese MIDs with the two superpowers -as a portion of its total MIDs -should be relatively constant. Yet it is clear from Figure 14 that from around 1980 to 1992 this portion drops to near zero. There are at least three arguments about territory that suggest why China should be especially prone to disputes. First, disputes over land are essentially zero sum. Contiguous states, therefore, are more likely to fight with each other than non-contiguous ones, controlling for distance and technologies of power projection. It follows, then, that states with more borders will be more dispute-prone than those with fewer borders, on average. The PRC has had land and ocean borders with anywhere from 15 to 21 states during its existence as a state, more than most. Secondly, new states are likely to be more sensitive to territorial issues because the territorial integrity of the state will be central to establishing the legitimacy of the regime. Thirdly, prospect theory might apply here as well: states are more likely to take risks defending what they have than acquiring what they seek to gain. Together, these three arguments suggest that China, as a new state with lots of borders, will be more risk acceptant about consolidating its territorial integrity. If this proposition is generally right, then one ought to find that most of China's disputes in the early years of the regime were territorial and that the largest portion of all territorial disputes occurred in the earlier years of the regime.
The data are roughly consistent with these hypotheses. Almost half of China's MIDs were related to territorial issues, and 41 per cent of these territorial MIDs occurred in the first ten years of the regime. In addition, the cumulative sum of different MID types (Figure 15 ) indicates the rate of increase in territorial disputes is faster than other kinds of disputes in Similar patterns show up in other states. For Soviet MIDs, for instance, in the first five-year period after the founding of the state in 1918 territorial disputes comprised the largest portion of all MIDs. Cumulatively, territorial MIDs were also the predominant type of dispute in the first three five-year periods (Figure 16 ). In India (Figure 17) , territorial disputes comprised an even larger proportion of its early MIDs than in either the Chinese or the Soviet cases. As in China, and to some extent the Soviet Union, the rate of increase in Indian territorial MIDs peaked in the first two to three five-year periods after the founding of the state.
Status gaps and foreign policy.
A fifth explanation draws on status inconsistency theory. 50 Here the argument would be that in periods where the perceived gap between the status desired by an actor and the status ascribed or bestowed by other actors was largest one should expect to see a higher frequency of conflictual behaviour. The argument is a basic frustration-aggression one: status inconsistent states will tend to believe that the reason for the lack of "respect" accorded to them is a result of their insufficient material power and their insufficient willingness to demonstrate this power. That the strategies chosen to close the status gap should be coercive implies that states have internalized realpolitik world views where relative material power is equated with relative status. That is, the more powerful they are the more status they believe will be ascribed to them. It is known that Mao accepted this correlation and the realpolitik causal argument that supported it. Indeed, in Maoist China status inconsistency was a major issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute. By the late 1950s, Mao was utterly disillusioned with the perceived lack of respect that China's interests were being accorded in Moscow. The records of his conversations with Khrushchev in 1958 when the Russian leader tried to sell him a proposal to set up a joint Sino-Soviet navy and to allow the Soviets to build a submarine communications base in China indicated how little Mao believed the Soviets were acting in a spirit of mutual equality. Christensen has found evidence that Mao's manufacturing of the Jinmen-Mazu crisis in the summer of 1958 was in large part motivated by a desire to use an external danger to mobilize the Chinese people to increase industrial output which could be then turned into military power. Once this had been done, Mao remarked, the Americans (and Soviets) would have to take Chinese interests into account.
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One should therefore expect that periods where MID frequencies or hostility and violence levels are highest should be precisely those periods where Chinese leaders are most dissatisfied with their international status. How one might assess this dissatisfaction with status quo, however, is not obvious. As an initial effort to develop a measure, the Correlates of War figures for national share of material capabilities were used. 52 As this figure declines it can be assumed Chinese leaders are more dissatisfied with their international status and are therefore more conflict-prone. As the figure increases the leaders ought to be more satisfied with China's relative status. A bivariate OLS regression indicates that there is indeed a significant negative relationship between change in China's relative material power on the one hand and the frequency of MIDs (adjusted R 2 = 0.1, p = 0.03) and the cumulative amount of MID violence per year (adjusted R 2 = 0.16, p = 0.009) on the other. These findings would suggest, then, that China's dispute proneness is positively related to the gap in relative power between China and other major powers in the system. As this gap has closed, as Chinese leaders have become less dissatisfied with extant status inconsistencies, the frequency of MIDs has declined. This suggests that China either has tended not to exploit its growing share of world power to pursue interests coercively, or that other states have tended not to challenge China as its power has grown, or both. It is more likely to be the former, however, since this negative relationship between the growth of China's relative power and its MID involvement holds even more strongly in China's relations with the United States (adjusted R 2 = 0.19, p = 0.005). This is a relationship where absolute American power has always exceeded that of China. Thus even as Chinese power has grown relative to that of other major powers it has become less involved in MIDs with the United States, even though American power has always been sufficient to be undeterred by China. That is, it is probably not the case that as China's relative power has grown the United States has been less willing or able to challenge China. Rather, even as China's relative power has increased it has been less likely to challenge the United States. This would be consistent with a status inconsistency explanation for China's dispute involvement.
Conclusion
This study has provided a preliminary analysis of new data on Chinese dispute behaviour. In comparative terms, during the Cold War period 52. Here I used China's share of the total power of all major powers, rather than all states in the system. My reasoning was simple: China tended to compare itself with other major powers. In principle, therefore, its relative power position among major powers should matter more to its perception of status than its relative power position among all other states, large and small.
The China Quarterly
China was more dispute-prone than most other major powers except for the United States. China also tended to resort to higher levels of violence in disputes than did other major powers and India. In other words, while China was not the most likely of the major powers to fall into crises and militarized conflicts, it was more likely to use a higher level of violence than other states in such a dispute. These data do not sit comfortably with much of the existing Western or Chinese literature on the uses of force in PRC history. I do not claim that the findings should thus supersede all previous scholarship on the question. I have used very different data and different analytical methods with different problems of inference. There is still a need to carefully calibrate the findings in the qualitative and quantitative literature: there is plenty of room for studies that explore cases where the different data and methods either confirm or question each other. But these data do suggest that there should be some scepticism towards the conventional wisdom. They also raise some interesting hypotheses about the centrality of a sensitivity to territorial integrity and international status in Chinese dispute management behaviour, hypotheses that deserve to be put on the research agenda of Chinese foreign policy studies.
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Before advocates for the neo-containment of China abuse these data for alarmist and ethnocentric claims about China's aggressive intentions, however, the tests of various explanations for patterns in the data underscore two important caveats. First, the largest portion of Chinese dispute behaviour has involved territorial issues and the consolidation of long-standing territorial claims. This partially explains why the annual frequency of Chinese militarized disputes has declined over time: as the regime consolidated power domestically, it also tried to assert control over its boundaries, either through negotiated border settlement or force. This should not be surprising: control over its borders and a demonstrated capacity to ensure territorial integrity are critical pillars for the internal and external legitimacy of a sovereign state.
Secondly, the growth of China's relative power capabilities by itself has not led to an increase in Chinese dispute proneness. Rather, as China's share of world power resources has increased -and by extension as the perceived gap between ascribed and desired international status has closed -China has tended not to act in a more confiictual manner. The frequency of MIDs, for instance, has not increased appreciably over the 1980s even as China's economic and military power has developed. This suggests, very tentatively, that excessive fears of a power transition-type clash between China and the United States, both vying for hegemonic status globally or in the Asia-Pacific regional subsystem, may not be 53. There is some work already emerging on patterns in China's diplomacy on territorial issues. See, for instance, Eric Hyer, "The South China Sea disputes: implications of China's earlier territorial settlements," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 34-54. See also Jean-Marc Blanchard, "Borders and Borderlands: an institutional approach to territorial disputes in Asia," Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, Political Science Department, 1997. The sources of China's concern with international status and image, and the trade-offs Chinese leaders make between maximizing status and maximizing other goals such as development and security is, however, still a severely neglected topic.
warranted. 54 Taken together, these two conclusions suggest that China will be more likely to resort to force -and relatively high levels of force -when disputes involve territory and occur in periods where the perceived gap between desired and ascribed status is growing or large.
The findings of the study suggest, therefore, that the growth in Chinese power capabilities does not necessarily portend a more aggressive use of Chinese power, or more dispute involvement. Indeed, there may be less, as long as China's territorial integrity is not challenged and as long as it is accorded sufficient international status (such as involvement in all major international institutions and full partnership in major power action on global order issues).
But the findings do suggest that once in a militarized dispute China will tend to escalate to a relatively high level of force. With doctrinal changes in recent years that stress the offensive, even pre-emptive, use of military power, 55 and in the absence of alternative forms of crisis management, the preference may well be to use this force in a militarily offensive manner and further beyond China's "gates" than in past disputes, even if for politically "defensive" purposes. As research on the "cult of the offensive" among the major powers in Europe prior to the First World War implies, the kind of military doctrine developing in China, when interacting with the offensive preferences of the American military, is likely to reduce further the time available for, and the inclination to resort to, diplomatic measures designed to head off military conflict. 56 In other words, the interactive effect of Chinese and American military doctrines in any future Sino-U.S. political crisis -say over the Taiwan issue -will create stronger incentives for both sides to engage in pre-emption, whether on a local or strategic scale. This process may well undermine the timely search for political solutions. The possibility that Chinese military planners may, in the next century, be forced to deal with American national missile defences that undermine China's fragile nuclear deterrent only increases the incentives for China to pre-empt in a crisis over high value territory and sovereignty issues before such defences are credible. American plans for the unilateral deployment of ballistic missile defences threatened to destabilize U.S.-Soviet deterrence in the 1980s by providing the Soviets incentives to strike early in a major crisis before facing a degradation in their deterrent. Similarly, there is reason to believe that a world of asymmetrical ballistic missile defences will destabilize Sino-U.S. relations in the 21st century. Both sides, therefore, should be engaged in discussions over how to revise their offence-dominant doctrines to conform to a more desirable defencedominant relationship. That is, both sides should be trying to find ways to reduce fears of pre-emption in crises. 57 In sum, the development of alternative approaches to conflict and dispute management may well be a critical variable in reducing China's dispute and violence proneness into the future, and in minimizing the chances of direct Sino-U.S. military conflict. In this respect it is encouraging that specialists in the Chinese military are beginning to investigate the principles of non-violent or low violence conflict management techniques aimed at preventing insecurity spirals, miscommunication, the "zero-sumization" of disputes, among other pathologies of crises. 58 The concrete manifestations of these principles -bilateral and multilateral hotlines, joint crisis management centres, doctrinal and operational transparency, mutually acceptable and verifiable constraints on military exercises and deployed capabilities, among other techniques -ought to be high on the agenda of all states and multilateral institutions interested in "engaging" China. 57 . In the paradoxical world of nuclear deterrence, the existence of survi vable second strike offensive capabilities creates a defence-dominant environment because no side can strike first or move offensively without risking destruction in return. A world with asymmetric strategic defences, therefore, is not a defence-dominant one. It is, rather, the opposite because it creates the option for one side to strike first and defend against retaliation. There is no reason to assume that with the end of the American-Soviet rivalry the basic elements of nuclear deterrence believed to operate in the Cold War are inapplicable in the American-Chinese relationship. The U.S. ought to be assisting China to develop an assured second strike minimum deterrence capability, by providing, for instance, early warning technologies, safety mechanisms for command and control, and submarine launched ballistic missile technology in return for verifiable, bilateral and/or multilateral commitments to eschew MIRVing, ballistic missile defence, and anti-satellite weapons development and deployment. It was conceptually possible for the U.S. to have made various offers to the Russians to help in developing mutual BMD capabilities on the grounds this was strategically stabilizing. While the offers -made in both the Reagan and Clinton administrations -were probably disingenuous, it is not beyond the realm of the reasonable that the U.S. should consider offers to help develop a Sino-U.S. defence-dominant nuclear relationship. In recent years China has put some of these principles into practice with a small number of bilateral and multilateral agreements on confidence-building measures with India, Russia, the Central Asian republics. These agreements include such steps as prior notification of military exercises and restrictions on the size of forces that can exercise near borders.
